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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
Case No. 20060309-CA 
THOMAS CLARK HILL, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a plea and subsequent sentencing to Aggravated 
Assault, a third degree felony in violation of UCA§76-5-103, and Violation of 
a Protective Order, a third degree felony in violation of UCA§76-5-108. On 
March 13, 2006, the Honorable Roger S. Dutson signed an entry of judgment, 
sentence and commitment sentencing the Defendant to serve two consecutive 
terms of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. On April 12, 2006, the 
Defendant filed an amended notice of appeal. This Court has jurisdiction over 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO PRISON? 
Standard of Review: The Court must determine whether the trial court abused 
its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to consecutive prison sentences 
prison even though the advances were accomplished in the same criminal 
episode. "A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has 
abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed 
a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits.55 State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 
454,456 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
§ 76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode-
Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act 
of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which 
may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the 
act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under any 
other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall 
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
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(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of 
preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise 
included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
§ 76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences-Limitations—Definition 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate 
in the order of judgment and commitment: 
^ 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively 
to each other; and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or 
consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if 
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, 
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing 
would be inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and 
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, 
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the 
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentence for offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode as defined in section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of 
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, 
except as provided under Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on 
conduct which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are 
imposed. 
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(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which 
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; 
or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the 
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal 
jurisdiction, and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not 
occur after his initial sentencing by any other court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board 
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been 
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly 
imposed prison terms as follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the 
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, 
if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently 
with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides 
the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity 
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually 
served under the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to 
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a 
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not 
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been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where 
the person is located. 
§76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), 
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
§76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another — Violation. 
(1) Any person who is the respondent or defendant subject to a protective 
order, child protective order, ex parte protective order, or ex parte child 
protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or 
Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile Court Act of 1996, Title 77, Chapter 36, 
Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act, or a foreign protection order enforceable 
under Title 30, Chapter 6a, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Domestic 
Violence Protection Orders Act, who intentionally or knowingly violates that 
order after having been properly served, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, 
except as a greater penalty may be provided in Title 77, Chapter 36, Cohabitant 
Abuse Procedures Act. 
(2) Violation of an order as described in Subsection (1) is a domestic 
violence offense under Section 77-36-1 and subject to increased penalties in 
accordance with Section 77-36-1.1. 
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(2003). Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
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(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was originally charged by information with aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony; aggravated kidnapping a first degree felony; 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony; violation of protective order, a third 
degree felony; possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a third 
degree felony; and attempted murder a second-degree felony. (R. 001). On 
October 21, 2005, the Defendant appeared in court and conditionally waived 
his preliminary hearing. On January 13, 2006, the Defendant pled guilty to the 
charges Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony in violation of UCA§76-5-
103, and Violation of a Protective Order, a third degree felony in violation of 
UCA§76-5-108. The State dismissed the remaining charges pursuant to the 
plea negotiation. The Defendant was sentenced on March 13, 2006, to two 
consecutive terms of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. (R. 061). The 
Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on March 13, 2006. A 
notice of appeal was filed on April 12,006. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was originally charged by information with aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony, aggravated kidnapping a first degree felony, 
aggravated assault a third degree felony, violation of protective order a third 
degree felony, possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person a third 
degree felony, and attempted murder a second-degree felony.(R. 001). 
According to the facts set forth by the prosecution at the time of the entry of 
the plea, the Defendant was served with a protective order on May 18, 2005. 
The protective order prohibited the Defendant from having any direct or 
indirect contact, committing any acts of violence, or being at the victim's 
residence. The Defendant had previously been convicted of domestic violence 
on June 4, 2003. On or about August 9, 2005, the Defendant was staying at the 
victim's residence, and he and the victim got into an argument. During the 
argument the Defendant used an "army style butter knife" against the victim 
and stabbed her in the back of the neck causing a small puncture wound and 
also stabbed her in the arm, again causing a small puncture wound. (R. 073 / 4) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced the Defendant to 
consecutive terms at the Utah State Prison. The Court should have considered 
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the four mitigating factors outlined in State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 30 (Utah 1998). 
Several of these factors work in Defendant's favor. (1) Although there was a 
victim to the offense, there was not significant injury done to the victim. (2) 
There is a significant disagreement as to the extent of the Defendant's record, 
with allegations by the Defendant that much of the felony record reported in 
the presentence investigation report was inaccurate; (3) the Defendant 
expressed to the trial court his desire to put his life back in order, and (4) the 
court didn't consider his rehabilitative needs and the fact that he could have 
become a productive member of society through a less drastic sentencing 
alternative. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO CONSECUTIVE 
PRISON TERMS ON OFFENSES THAT OCCURRED IN 
THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE. 
The sentencing decision of a trial court is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)(per 
curium). This includes the decision to grant or deny probation. See, State v. 
Chapoose, 985 P.2d 915 (Utah 1999). An abuse of discretion occurs when "the 
judge fails to consider all legally relevant factors or if the sentence imposed is 
clearly excessive." State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 
o 
1990)(citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, an appellate court can 
only find an abuse of discretion "it if can be said that no reasonable [person] 
would take the view adopted by the trial court.'5 State v. Honk, 906 P.2d at 909 
(alteration in original)(quotations omitted). 
The trial court abused its discretion in this case because it failed to 
consider all the legally relevant factors and it imposed an excessive sentence. 
Specifically, the trial court failed to consider the Defendant's rehabilitative 
needs. 
The Defendant pled guilty to a violation of a protective order and 
aggravated assault, both arising in the same criminal episode. At the time of 
sentencing there was a significant dispute regarding the accuracy of the 
Defendant's prior criminal record as reported in the presentence report. 
According to the Defendant in he was a victim of identity theft, and his name 
and social security number were used by another individual who was 
ultimately convicted of several felony offenses and served time in prison. The 
Defendant acknowledges that he has a relatively long criminal record, but 
denied that he had the lengthy record as reported in the presentence 
investigation. The Defendant did admit that he had been incarcerated in 
California in 1974 on two different commitments and that he had gone to the 
Utah State prison in 1979. (R. 073 / 8) 
10 
The trial court indicated that it's inclination was to send him to prison 
because "what really causes me the concern [is] three prior imprisonments and 
continued violation of serious laws." (R. 073 / 9) The trial court did not ever 
consider or address the Defendant's rehabilitative needs. Defense counsel 
argued that these were crimes that constituted a single criminal episode. This 
argument was made in reliance on § 76-1-402 Single Criminal Episode, and § 
76-3-401(2) which provides in relevant part: 
In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the 
history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
The court stated, "they are different in the sense that would you got a stabbing 
and you also have a protective order violation, his being there violates the 
protective order and then the consequent stabbing is a separate offense, and I 
think both of them, with his history, are sufficient to justify consecutive 
sentences. (R. 073/10) 
The possibility of rehabilitation by the Defendant together with his 
disputed criminal history was apparently not considered by the trial court. In 
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court outlined four 
mitigating factors that the trial court failed to consider. The Court reversed the 
trial courts' decisions to impose consecutive sentences. The consideration of 
these four mitigating factors is not discretionary with the sentencing court, but 
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is required by the Utah Supreme Court decision. In Galli, the Supreme Court 
found that the trial courts' abused their discretion. "[T]he record shows that 
Judges Iwasaki and Rigtrup may not have given adequate weight to certain 
mitigating circumstances." Id. at 938. 
There were at least two factors that the trial courts failed to consider 
that caused them to abuse their discretion. Several of these factors can be 
applied favorably to the Defendant's situation. The first factor was that Galli 
had not inflicted physical injuries on his victims. Id. Galli had used a gun, but 
it was a pellet gun that was incapable of inflicting a serious injury. Id. In the 
case at bar, although the Defendant had inflicted some physical injury on his 
victim1 that physical injury consisted of a couple of very small knife punctures 
and obviously did not rise to the level of serious bodily injury or the Defendant 
would have been charged with a second-degree felony aggravated assault. 
The second factor in Galli was that his criminal history did not support 
the imposition of consecutive sentences. Id. Here the Defendant did have 
some prior criminal record, including a couple of prison sentences. However, 
there is a significant dispute as to the length and extent of the Defendant's 
criminal record due to the claims of identity theft. The third factor was that 
Galli had voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility for his crimes. 
1
 In the present case there was a single victim, unlike Galli. 
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"The record suggests that he has expressed a commitment and hope to improve 
himself." Id. In the case at bar, the Defendant waived the preliminary hearing, 
which allowed for the Defendant not to have this testify from the stand. 
Furthermore, the Defendant voluntarily pled guilty to the two crimes on which 
he was convicted, further relieving the victim of the necessity to appear in 
court to testify as to the occurrences on the day in question. 
The fourth and final Galli factor was that consecutive sentences were 
not in accord with Galli's rehabilitative needs. The Supreme Court believed 
that Galli's conduct in Minnesota showed that he had the ability to improve 
himself and be a productive law abiding citizen. Id. Unfortunately in the case 
at bar, the trial court totally failed to look at any possible rehabilitative needs of 
the Defendant. The trial court is absolutely silent regarding any possible 
analysis as to the Defendant's ability to function in society, his ability to obtain 
new or different training, or the rehabilitative needs the Defendant could use in 
an effort to attempt to rehabilitate him back into society. 
The trial court should have considered all of the factors outlined by the 
Supreme Court in Galli. The trial court failed to consider these factors, and 
therefore abused its discretion when it sentenced Defendant to the Utah State 
Prison. For these reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to 
remand this case back to the trial court so he can be re-sentenced. 
1-2 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider 
Defendant's rehabilitative needs. The sentence was clearly excessive in the 
imposition of consecutive sentences for a single criminal episode, and in the 
absence of any analysis as to the advisability and possibility of rehabilitation. 
For these reasons the Defendant respectfully requests this Court to remand his 
case back to the trial court to be re-sentenced. 
DATED this & day of October 2006. 
LNDALL W. (RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to 
Mark Shurtleff, Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 
South, 6th Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake gfty,JJtah 841 l^ OJL^O, postage 
prepaid this h day of October 2006. 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney at Law 
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COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS CLARK HILL, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051903912 FS 
Judge: ROGER S DUTSON 4%p
 y 
Date March 13, 2006 4 
^ % 
PRESENT 
Clerk: dianew 
Prosecutor: MARK R. DECARIA 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): JIM RETALLICK (PDA) 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 12, 1942 
Video 
Tape Number: D031306 Tape Count: 354 
3. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/13/2006 Guilty 
4. VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 01/13/2006 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is before the Court for sentencing. Defendant 
present in custody from the Weber County Jail. Court finds 
no legal basis why sentence should not be imposed. 
Case No: 051903912 
Date: Mar 13, 2006 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE 
ORDER a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Prison terms imposed to run consecutively to one another. 
Credit is granted for ti^ ie served. 
Dated this /> day of ^v^£^ 
iOGER # DUTSON 
District Court Judqe 
ADDENDUM B 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
THOMAS C. HILL, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 051903912 
Appellate Case No. 20060309-CA 
January 13, 2006 
March 13, 2006 
Pretrial Conference 
Sentencing 
Page 1 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE ROGER S. DUTSON 
CAROLYN ERJCKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
1 OGDEN, UTAH - JANUARY 13, 20 0 6 
2 HONORABLE ROGER S. DUTSON PRESIDING 
3 I For the Plaintiff: BRANDEN B. MILES 
For the Defendant: ROY COLE 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
6 I COURT CLERK: State of Utah versus Thomas C. 
7 J Hill,#051903912. Are we going to need the court reporter? 
MR. COLE: We're not. Mr. Hill, Your Honor. I think 
9 | we have a resolution in this matter. Mr. Hill is going to pled 
10 guilty to courts 3 and 4 in the matter, being aggravated 
11 J assault and violation of a protective orders with priors, both 
12 I 3rd degree felonies to run concurrently. All other counts will 
13 be dismissed. 
14 THE COURT: The first degree felony is to be 
15 dismissed? 
16 MR. MILES: It is, Your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: And have you gone over this with the 
18 victim? 
19 MR. MILES: I've talked to her at the pretrial about 
20 dismissing that count and why and that's primarily based on the 
21 fact that she has lied to us. She gave us statements about the 
22 way things happened and then later on admitted she had lied to 
23 us about those things. So the State would not have sufficient 
24 evidence for the first degree felonies in this case. 
25 THE COURT: All right. And you have a written in 
1 support of this plea? 
2 MR. COLE: I do, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Have you gone over that, Mr. Hill? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
5 THE COURT: And do you understand it? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: You understand if you sign that document 
8 agreeing to plead guilty to two third degree felonies, an 
9 aggravated assault and a violation of a protective orders with 
10 priors you would give up the right to have the State prove that 
11 or make the State prove that at a trial. You'd be admitting 
12 those violations even though the others are dismissed. You 
13 understand that? 
14 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
15 THE COURT: You shouldn't do this unless you are 
16 guilty or believe it's in your best interest to do so. And if 
17 you're on any medications, alcohol, drugs or have any mental 
18 health condition that would make it so you don't fully 
19 understand, you shouldn't go ahead, nor should you proceed if 
20 you're not satisfied with the legal representation that you 
21 have received or if you don't understand the wording of this 
22 agreement. Do you wish to go ahead? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
24 THE COURT: You may sign it then. 
25 MR. COLE: It's already been signed by myself and by 
1 Mr. Miles. 
2 THE COURT: Okay, it appears the defendant is acting 
3 freely and voluntarily. 
4 Now, is there a weapon enhancement on any of these as 
5 they now stand? 
6 MR. MILES: On count 3 and 4 there is not, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Now, counts 3 and 4 are not the same on 
8 your complaint, apparently, as on the calendar, because count 2 
9 is the aggravated assault. 
10 MR. MILES: Okay. You don't have our amended 
11 information that we filed on-
12 J THE COURT: I might but I just know the calendar shows 
13 that. 
14 COURT CLERK: Shows what? 
15 THE COURT: That count 2 is aggravated assault. 
16 COURT CLERK: Well, count 1 was already dismissed so 
17 that's why it's not appearing on the calendar. Technically the 
18 aggravated kidnaping is count 2. That aggravated assault is 
19 count 3. 
20 THE COURT: Okay, so that's how it's counted out, but 
21 anyway we're talking about an aggravated assault and a 
22 violation of a protective order and they're not enhanced at all 
23 by the weapon. 
24 MR. MILES: No, we did not file an enhancement. 
25 THE COURT: With that. 
1 MR. MILES: Correct. 
2 THE COURT: All right, to the charge of aggravated 
3 assault, a third degree felony, how do you plead? 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
5 THE COURT: And to the violation of a protective order 
6 with prior convictions for violating a protective order or 
7 domestic violence offense, how do you pled? 
8 THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
9 THE COURT: What does the State claim happened here? 
10 MR. MILES: Your Honor, on the date alleged in the 
11 information, I'll start with the protective order first. The 
12 defendant was a respondent for a protective order with that 
13 victim being the petitioner. He was served with a valid copy 
14 of that protective order on May 18th of 2005. That protective 
15 order prohibited him from having any direct or indirect 
16 contact, committing any acts of violence or being at the 
17 petitioner's residence. On the date alleged in the information 
18 the defendant was also previously convicted of domestic 
19 violence, assault on June 4th of 2003. That occurred here in 
20 front of Judge Medley here in the Second District Court. On 
21 the dates alleged in the information of August 9th of 2005, the 
22 defendant was staying at the residence. He and the victim got 
23 into a argument where he grabbed sort of Army style butter 
24 knife during the argument and he stabbed her in the back of the 
25 neck, causing a small puncture there and then he ended up 
1 stabbing her also in the arm, causing a small puncture again 
2 there. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. The Court will make this written 
4 statement in support of a plea a part of the official record 
5 and find sufficient facts to enter the plea and order for it t 
6 I be Adult Probation (inaudible) 
7 | COURT CLERK: February 27th. 
THE COURT: February 27th. We'll see you back here 
9 I then. 
10 J (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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MR. RETALLICK: No. 4 on the calendar, Thomas Hill, 
Your Honor 
COURT CLERK: State of Utah versus Thomas C. Hill, 
case #051903912. Time set for sentencing. 
THE COURT: - probation officer that I agree with the 
concept of what he was trying to get across with the 
recommendation for jail but -
MR. RETALLICK: This is Mr. Hill, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: (inaudible) keeps doing that. 
MS. ?: Yes, Your Honor. 
MR. RETALLICK: As the Court may recall this matter 
was continued for AP&P to try to verify some of the criminal 
history of defendant. 
THE COURT: We need to see what these California 
charges really were all about. 
MR. RETALLICK: Your Honor, according to an 
investigation done my Mr. LePlant, he said prior to preparing 
pre-sentence report "I reviewed the defendant's arrest history 
extensively, comparing his birth date and social security 
number to the BCI and Triple I information. I also reviewed 
1 limited computer records for AP&P regarding his commitment to 
2 the Utah State Prison in A78 and '81. Made contact with Alisha 
3 • Wilson, tech for BCI who informed me that prior to an arrest 
4 being placed on defendant's arrest record they had compared the 
5 arrested person's fingerprints with the ones they currently 
6 have on file. They also used fingerprints to identify alias of 
7 individuals." ' 
8 And so basically they're saying that the criminal 
9 history that they have here is correct. Mr. Hill again is 
10 refuting many of the items. He does admit that he was in 
11 prison once before and that he had successfully terminated 
12 prison in 1981; that - and quite frankly, Your Honor/ I have a 
13 real difficult time believing this Alisha Wilson tech with BCI 
14 saying every time they place on somebody's records they compare 
15 the fingerprints. I can't tell you how many times I've been 
16 here with people who have not been - their criminal history has 
17 shown - or indicated crimes that they were in fact not guilty 
18 of and so I, you know, I just - I find it absolutely amazing 
19 that they're going to compare fingerprints every 
20 time they attribute something as long as the social security 
21 and birth date match up, that's all they usually go on. 
22 Mr. Hill maintains that he was the victim of an 
23 identify theft. An old roommate of his took his name, date of 
24 birth and social security number and has been using it for a 
25 number of years. But Mr. Hill does admit that he was in prison 
1 in 1981. He admits that he had some minor offenses, the 
2 disorderly conduct. In 1987 it says fugitive from justice. 
3 There was a warrant served and he was returned to California. -
4 Wasn't it, in fact, you still maintain that was not 
5 you, is that correct? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: That wasn't me. 
7 I MR. RETALLICK: He has never been extradited to 
California in any case, Your Honor. 
9 I He admits the domestic violence in 2001. I think he 
10 admits the simple assault, class B, in 2003. So I don't know 
11 where we go from here, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: Well, I'll make note of those differences 
13 and frankly I show two commitments in California, one in x74 in 
14 Kachino and one in Susanville. Do you admit those? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: I did (inaudible). 
16 THE COURT: And then you were sent to prison in Utah 
17 in ^79. 
18 THE DEFENDANT: (inaudible). 
19 THE COURT: There's a possibility that you are correct 
20 on the identity theft. However having referred it back to 
21 Adult Probation department, it does look like they have now 
22 gone back to compare fingerprints at least. Perhaps they don't 
23 always but I do believe that this re-referral that that has 
24 been confirmed. 
25 MR. RETALLICK: It doesn't state that there was any 
comparison of fingerprints, Your Honor. What it states is that 
DCI says before they do this, this is the general rule. It 
doesn't state that they specifically did it for this defendant. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Well, they're confirming what I had 
reguested. I understand your argument. 
Anything more, Mr. Hill? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Does the State have anything further? 
MR. DECARIA: Now I'm concerned about what the 
defendant is contending with regard to this past criminal 
record. 
THE COURT: Frankly I don't think it's going to make 
too much difference to the Court because, except for the prison 
terms, that's what really causes me the concern of three prior 
imprisonments and continued violations of serious laws. That's 
what I'm basing my sentence on. 
MR. DECARIA: Okay, I'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Other than the ones that are clearly 
admitted here but they're misdemeanors. 
It is the sentence of this Court that you serve a 
zero to five year term at the Utah State Prison on the 
aggravated assault and that you serve a zero to five year term 
on the violation of the protective order and because of your 
serious history, I'm ordering that they run consecutive to each 
other. You've not shown that you've changed sufficiently to 
justify otherwise. I'll give you credit for time served on 
these charges since you were booked but these are to run 
consecutive to each other. 
MR. RETALLICK: Your Honor, weren't these one 
continuous criminal episode? 
THE COURT: Not really because the facts that gave 
rise to each were clearly different. 
MR. RETALLICK: I understand-
THE COURT: And they are different in the sense that 
when you've got a stabbing and you also have a protective order 
violation, his being there violates the protective order and 
then the consequent stabbing is a separate offense and I think 
both of them, with his history, are sufficient to justify 
consecutive sentences. That's (inaudible). 
Oh, Mr. Hill, you have 30 days in which to appeal the 
sentencing. 
(Whereupon the hearing.was concluded) 
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